In the present appeal, it is noted that four years and two days elapsed between March 3, 2014, the date on which the allegations were filed with the TEAC, and March 5, 2018, when the appellant was notified of the TEAC’s resolution. According to Article 66 of the LGT, this period of time would complete the four-year statute of limitations period. However, the State’s attorney disagrees as to the computation of this period. According to its analysis of the calendar, March 3, 2018 was a Saturday, the 4th was a Sunday and the next working day was Monday, the 5th. The State attorney cites Article 30.2 of the LPAC, which states that the periods indicated by days are understood as working days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. However, this provision does not apply when the computation of the term is by months or years, as in the present case. This has been recognized by a ruling of the Supreme Court, which establishes that in the case of monthly periods, the period ends on the day that coincides with the same number as the day of notification or publication.
Therefore, as it is a computation of deadlines by years, it should be counted from date to date, starting on March 3, 2014, the date on which the allegations were filed before the TEAC, and ending on March 3, 2018, regardless of the fact that this day is not a working day for procedural purposes. In such a case, the Administration should have notified the act before the end of that day to avoid the statute of limitations. The question of appeal is to determine whether the provision of Article 30.5 of the LPAC applies to the statute of limitations regulated in the LGT and on what date the last day (“dies a quo”) should be established in the event that the four-year period ends on a non-business day.
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